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Stock Investment Research with an Asian focus

2015- Our encouraging first year scorecard

25/1/2016

 
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It has been a little more than a year since we set up stockresearchasia.com in early 2015 to provide Asia based investors with proprietary stock research. While we did not envision it at the beginning, 2015 has turned out on hindsight to be a tricky year for investors to navigate in Asian equity markets. And 2016, for now at least, has proven to be far worse. Many Asian markets have plunged in tandem with the global markets to levels last seen in 2012 or earlier, led by China and exacerbated by an oil price collapse. It is hard to predict when the malaise would end except it inevitably will. As Herb Stein famously remarked and we agree, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” In the meantime, we should see the market throw up good buying opportunities, ones that we hopefully can continue to exploit to our advantage.

It is against this backdrop that we are proud to say that our calls in the last year or so have mostly been spot on.  To recap, we have made outright recommendations on six stocks, five listed on SGX (Memstar, Chuan Hup, PCRD, MILF, IPC) and one on Bursa (Abric). We have also, when deemed fit, made a few situational analyses (Falcon Energy, Kejuruteraan Samudra Timur, Tiger Airways), giving investors some insights into ongoing corporate actions or potential strategic options from a corporate finance perspective.

Performance of our picks

Overall, our recommendations have outperformed the benchmark indices on an absolute basis by an average of 23% as at 31 December 2015. The outperformance would have been more pronounced if annualised but we see the computation of such data misleading and academic in nature at best. The 5 buy recommendations generated an average total return (including dividends) of 13.9%. This includes the short term arbitrage of MIIF where profits were locked in after just 2 weeks. Excluding MIIF, the buy recommendations generated average returns of 16.5%. Memstar, our lone sell recommendation, was down 55.0% as at end 2015 before getting suspended for being unable to complete its reverse takeover of Longmen Group, the transaction risk of which we have flagged out multiple times over the course of the year. 

A summary of our performance is presented below accompanied by key updates on selected companies that we have covered:
Stockresearchasia's recommendations have performed well vs benchmarks
Figure 1. Our recommendations have outperformed benchmark indices by a significant margin

Abric Berhad- cash realised from impending delisting

Following a year during which Abric has failed to find a suitable acquisition opportunity for it to extend its Bursa listing, the company has announced on 18 January 2016 that it will be going ahead with a delisting exercise. In conjunction with the delisting exercise, the company has announced a cash distribution of RM0.43 per share (vs last traded price of RM 0.48), which we estimate is roughly equal to its cash holdings less all liabilities as at September 2015 on a fully diluted basis. This does not include the approximately RM0.07 cash it was due to receive 12 months after the completion of disposal in December 2014 (i.e. December 2015).

As Abric has already announced its decision to dispose of its remaining assets and voluntarily wind-up, shareholders are expected to be entitled to a further cash distribution post delisting. We think that shareholders should also be able to realise an eventual amount close to the Company’s NAV of RM0.64 per share. With a finely balanced shareholding structure (controlling Ong family owns 35%, super minority Pui Cheng Wui 23% and others 42%, fully diluted assuming full conversion of warrants), minority shareholders can also take heart that their interests should be fairly taken care of post delisting. 

Memstar Technology- RTO woes not over

Memstar’s troubles in trying to complete the acquisition of Longmen Group continues unabated. In our previous report, we questioned Memstar’s over optimistic valuation of the target, then valued at US$420 million. Following the umpteenth supplemental agreement, the acquisition price has been revised downwards first to US$323 million in July, then to US$200 million in December, translating into an eye-popping 52.4% in reduction in value in less than a year! This is accompanied by a loosening in the conditions precedent of the acquisition particularly those pertaining to the Target group’s fund raising obligations. However, given the difficult current market conditions, we are still not optimistic that the conditions can be met even with the significantly lowered bar. And to add to shareholders’ woes, Memstar has suspended trading of its shares yet again on 6 January 2016. 

The only silver lining in all these is in SGX’s decision to grant the Memstar additional time (until end May 2016) to complete the acquisition. We can only hope that Memstar shareholders have taken heed of our multiple warnings and disposed of their holdings in time.

Chuan Hup Holdings- hit mainly by FX losses

When we first recommended Chuan Hup, it was on the back of its extremely robust balance sheet, under-appreciated assets and the possibility of a bumper dividend arising from its disposal of CHO shares to Falcon Energy. While Chuan Hup’s financial strength and asset backing have remained largely unchanged, we were disappointed in the board’s decision not to reward its shareholders with a bigger payout. It did announce and pay a total dividend of 3 cts though for its financial year ending 30 June 2015, representing a yield of almost 10% of the prevailing price when our report was first posted.

Results wise, Chuan Hup continues to be hit by the effects of a strengthening US dollar against both SGD and AUD even if its units’ underlying businesses have not deteriorated as much. PCI, its SGX listed electronics manufacturing arm, for example, recorded a 62% plunge in its latest 1Q16 profit after tax from US$1.6 million to US$0.6 million, largely due to a US$1.5 million foreign exchange loss (vs +US$0.1mil the year before). Strip that out and adjusting for mark-to-market profits/losses and the core profit would have remained almost the same as the 1Q15’s. Similarly, a US$6.1 million hit from foreign exchange losses was the main culprit for Chuan Hup reporting a loss of US$3.9 million for 1Q16 vs a profit of US$3.0 million in 1Q15.

For its joint venture property development projects in Australia, the results have been mixed. Toccata, which has been completed is almost fully sold. We estimate that only 10-15% of the sales have yet to be recognised. Meanwhile, Concerto, the largest of the 3 projects by development value, has sold an additional 50 units over the past 11 months to achieve 68% in total sales. With completion due only in 2017, we believe there is still enough time for the JV to ramp up sales to 80-85% or more, similar to what Toccata achieved at its completion. Sales in Unison on Tenth, however, has made little progress in the last few months in particular and 48% of its units remain unsold despite the fast approaching completion deadline. That said, as we have stressed in our previous report, we do not expect any negative cashflow impact from these projects as Chuan Hup’s main obligations in these is in injecting the land while Finbar contributed the working capital. 
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Figure 2. Sales performance of Chuan Hup’s JV development projects have been mixed

As at the latest balance sheet date of 30 September 2015, we estimate that Chuan Hup still holds, after accounting for dividends paid after, adjusted net cash and short term securities worth S$0.194 per share or almost 73% of its last traded price of S$0.265, which should provide a strong buffer against the current market volatilities. 

Pacific Century Regional Development- delisting imminent if share buybacks continue

Since our report highlighting PCRD’s aggressive share buybacks and suggesting that this may be a prelude to majority shareholder Richard Li potentially privatising the company, PCRD has not shown any intent to restrain its share buyback activities. In the past 9 months, the company has acquired a further 89.1 million shares, shrinking the public float to a precariously low 10.2%. We estimate that the company can only acquire and cancel a further 5.1 million shares before its trading has to be halted pending a delisting decision to be made.
PCRD's share buybacks have boosted Richard Li's stake and shrunk public float
Figure 3. Aggressive share buyback from PCRD has shrunk public float precariously close to 10% threshold

To recap a point made in our update report on 5 May 2015:

“Under the current regulatory regime, there are a few ways that PCRD's privatisation could take place: through a general offer, a scheme of arrangement, a voluntary delisting or a forced delisting by SGX due to low free float (<10%) coupled with an exit offer. Based on current circumstances, we see the last two as the most likely options. Both would require a reasonable exit offer to be tabled and the appointment of an independent financial adviser ("IFA") to opine on the fairness of the offer as stipulated in the SGX listing rules. We note that IFAs tend to benchmark fair value of a company's shares to the market prices of its underlying assets where such values are available as in the case of PCRD. As such, we do not expect any exit offer, if it materialises, to deviate greatly from the fair value computed using this methodology in order to obtain a positive recommendation from the IFA.”
Share prices of PCCW and HKT  have held up well vs Hang Seng Index
Figure 4. PCRD’s key underlying assets, HKT and PCCW, are up 6.9% and 3.5% respectively in the last 3 months and has held up well vs HSI, which declined 17% over the same period.

As at 22 January 2016, PCRD’s stakes in PCCW and HKT, both of which shares have held up well despite the recent market turmoil, is worth a total of S$0.61 per share. While it remains to be seen if the “reasonable” offer by Richard Li comes close to matching the market value of PCRD’s underlying assets in the event the mandatory delisting and exit offer is triggered, we believe that that any IFA appointed will use this as a benchmark to base its recommendation on. Richard Li would thus find it hard to justify offering an amount that is significantly less. With the shares trading at $0.37 as at 22 January 2016, we believe PCRD still has significant upside. 

Closing note

While our first year scorecard has certainly been encouraging, our focus is solely on longer term returns. In that regard, we do not expect our picks to be able to outperform the markets by such wide margins year in year out. However, we are confident that with a relentless focus on value and our core competencies, we would be able to generate a positive return on our picks relative to the market over the long run. 

Pacific Century Regional Developments Ltd (PCRD)- Will Richard Li finally privatise PCRD?

16/4/2015

 
Richard Li (Source: Forbes)
Richard Li
PCRD Key Statistics
PCRD’s share price has doubled over the last 3 years to a multi-year high of S$0.345 as at 16 April 2015 but yet remains very much undervalued. With the Company aggressively buying back its shares and reducing its public float to just above 13%, we think there is a good chance that this will be the year Richard Li finally privatises the Company.

Background

Pacific Century Regional Developments Ltd ("PCRD") has been an integral part of billionaire Richard Li Tzar Kai's empire ever since he acquired control of the SGX-listed company in 1994. Currently, it serves mainly as an intermediate holding company for Hong Kong listed PCCW Ltd, which in turn controls:
  • now TV, Hong Kong's leading Pay TV operator; 
  • PCCW Solution, an IT services leader in Hong Kong and mainland China;
  • 70.8% (92.6%*) of HK-listed Pacific Century Premium Developments Limited ("PCPD"), positioned as a premium property developer with projects in Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand and Indonesia; and
  • 63.1% of HKT Trust and HKT Limited (together "HKT"), Hong Kong’s premier telecommunications service provider and listed in Hong Kong as stapled securities under a business trust structure.

*Note: Even though PCCW holds only 70.8% of the ordinary shares of PCPD, it also owns Bonus Convertible Notes issued in 2012 under an unusual bonus share cum bonus convertible note issue specifically executed to restore the public float of PCPD to more than 25%. The notes have been conferred the same economic rights as the bonus shares and give PCCW an effective economic interest in PCPD of 92.6% instead of 70.8%. 
PCCW group structure and services
Figure 1. PCRD Group Structure and Services

For FY2014, PCCW recorded total revenue of HK$33.27 billion and a profit after tax (PAT) and minority interests of HK$3.31 billion. However, this includes a gain of HK$1.31 billion on disposal of Pacific Century Place, Beijing by its subsidiary PCPD, without which the adjusted PAT would have been around HK$2.00 billion. Further, we estimate that HKT contributed approximately HK$1.93 billion or almost 97% of the adjusted PAT.

Crown Jewel HKT

Of all the assets within the PCRD group, the 63.1% owned HKT (previously known as Hong Kong Telecom) is by far the largest and most profitable.

HKT was first acquired by PCCW in August 2000 at the height of the dot-com bubble for over an estimated US$28 billion in cash and shares. Then, PCCW beat out a rival bid from Singtel, amidst rumours of Beijing's concerns over potentially sensitive telecom assets falling into foreign hands. The acquisition did not initially turn out well and saddled PCCW with massive debts. In subsequent years, PCCW tried disposing of various assets to raise cash in order to pare down its debts including ironically that of HKT's assets. Eventually, PCCW managed to spin off the HKT assets into a trust listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2011, raising US$1.2 billion in the process.

HKT is the undisputed leader in telecommunication services in Hong Kong. While it has long been the dominant player in the fixed-line and broadband services segments, its acquisition of CSL New World Mobility Ltd (“CSL”) from Australia-based Telstra in May 2014 for US$2.4 billion further catapulted it to the No. 1 position in mobile services as well. In Hong Kong, it has a market share of >60% for both fixed line and broadband segments and a 31% market share in the mobile segment.

Since listing in November 2011, HKT has performed well operationally. For the year ended 31 December 2014, it recorded total revenue of HK$28.8 billion and profit after tax of HK$ 3.1 billion, registering strong growth in both primarily due to a maiden 7.5 months contribution from the newly acquired CSL. Adjusted funds flow (defined as EBITDA minus capital expenditures, customer acquisition costs, license fees paid, taxes paid, net finance costs paid, and adjusted for changes in working capital), which HKT uses as a gauge for dividend distribution, has also grown steadily from FY2011 to FY2014 at a CAGR of 12%. With a first full-year contribution from CSL in 2015, top and bottom line as well as adjusted funds flow are expected to improve further. 
HKT historical performance chart
Figure 2. HKT's financial performance from FY2011 to FY2014

Other Business Segments

Although the other business segments such as PCCW Solutions and PCCW Media generated sizeable revenues, their contributions have been dwarfed by that of HKT. For FY2014, all the other business segments outside of HKT contributed just 14% of PCCW's total revenues and less than 1% of the group's EBITDA. This means that PCCW is at present in effect a proxy for HKT. That said, both PCCW Media and PCCW Solutions have continued to grow steadily and offer good growth opportunities.

PCCW Media, which includes the Pay-TV business operated under the brand "now TV", has been increasing its own entertainment production following a successful first TV drama series production "The Virtuous Queen of Han", which reached 38 million viewers in China. now TV's international footprint also continued to widen through affiliate partnerships to distribute now TV channels across countries in Asia and North America, with the latest addition being Taiwan.

PCCW was also recently awarded a 12-year licence to operate two free to air TV broadcast channels, becoming the first in 40 years to be awarded a new licence by the Hong Kong government. However, with the market dominated by a strong incumbent in TVB, we think the free TV licence is unlikely to contribute meaningfully to PCCW in the near future.

PCCW Solutions, an IT services leader in Hong Kong, has grown revenue and EBITDA by CAGR of 17% and 20% respectively over the last 3 years and continues to secure healthy orders. As at 31 December 2014, it has secured orders worth US$730 million (about 1.7x its FY2014 revenue) although we note that this is down slightly from the corresponding secured orders of US$819 million as at 31 December 2013.

PCRD trading at a steep discount to the value of its underlying assets

PCRD has only two significant assets on its books, its 21.8% stake in PCCW and a direct holding of 131,626,804 Share Stapled Units in HKT.

PCRD last traded at S$0.345 per share as at 16 April 2015, giving it a market capitalisation of S$945 million. Although its stake in PCCW is carried on its books at S$645 million, it is worth around S$1.45 billion on the market based on the closing price of HK$5.11 per share. In addition, PCRD's direct holding of Share Stapled Units in HKT is worth S$240 million. This means that at the current price, investors buying into PCRD are practically buying its controlling stake in PCCW as well as units in HKT at a huge 44.2% discount off the market value.  

To further establish that PCRD is indeed trading at a deep discount to its intrinsic value, we look at its key underlying asset, PCCW and compare its valuation against regional peers:
PCCW regional comparable companies
Figure 3. PCCW vs regional peers (Source: Bloomberg, company)

As you can see above, PCCW’s current valuation is in line with its peers based on both PE ratio ("PER") and dividend yield. However, to be conservative, we decided to peg PCCW to its implied valuation based on the highest dividend yield (4.5%, Starhub) and lowest PER (15.7x, China Mobile) of its peer group. 
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Figure 4. Fair value computation of PCRD

This resulted in a fair value price for PCCW of HK$4.38 per share. Based on this new fair value price, we established an implied fair value for PCRD of S$0.542 per share. The current price of S$0.345 is thus at a steep discount of 36.4% to its fair value, which we do not think is justified.  

Aggressive share buyback returning value to shareholders in lieu of dividends while concurrently shrinking public float

PCRD has embarked on an aggressive share buyback programme in the last one year, acquiring and cancelling 9.99% of its own shares equivalent to 303,932,200 shares in total and almost maximising the 10% limit allowed under its share purchase mandate approved at last year’s annual general meeting. While share buybacks are not uncommon, we note that this is one of the rare instances in Singapore where any company has actually bought back close to the maximum amount of shares allowable under its annual share purchase mandate. As a result of the aggressive purchases, the public float has shrunk to 13.1%, a level dangerously close to the minimum 10% limit stipulated by SGX.

We note that the Company has proposed a further renewal of the share purchase mandate for its upcoming shareholders' meeting on 24 April 2015. In its latest circular for the shareholders' meeting, it specifically catered for the scenario of a maximum purchase of 3% of its total outstanding shares. We see this as an indication that the Company is prepared to resume buying back its shares aggressively until such time when the public float is close to the minimum of 10%.    
PCRD share purchase mandate FY2015
Figure 5. Extract of share purchase mandate from PCRD circular

Delisting imminent?


One other direct effect of the aggressive buybacks has been the tightening of Richard Li and his Pacific Century Group's control on PCRD. 
Richard Li's shareholdings % in PCRD has increased
Figure 6. Richard Li’s control over PCRD on 15 April 15 vs 14 Mar 14

With Richard Li and the Pacific Century Group controlling almost 87% of PCRD’s total shareholdings and with the shares trading at a steep discount to its underlying intrinsic value, we think there is a good chance that this could be the year that Richard Li finally pulls the privatisation trigger. We see little justification now for PCRD as a de facto intermediate holding company within the Pacific Century Group to remain listed and incur unnecessary compliance and listing costs.

PCRD should continue to return sustainable value to shareholders even if privatisation does not take place

While we see a good chance of the Company being privatised, we also considered the possibility of PCRD remaining listed despite the low public float. Under this scenario, we think that the Company could possibly resume paying cash dividends to shareholders.

For FY2014, PCRD returned almost S$76.9 million of capital through share buybacks alone. With the free float at only 13%, it is only a matter of time when the Company maxes out on its share buyback limits. What next then? For a start, we should note that the PCRD is an investment holding company with no other core operations on its own. This means that it does not have much need for capital or operating expenditures other than to maintain its listing and other corporate expenses.

Its main sources of cash income are derived primarily from its stake in PCCW and its holdings in HKT. 
PCCW has consistently paid out dividends
Figure 7. PCCW's EPS and DPS from FY2010 to FY2014 (^Note: Payout ratio and EPS for FY2014 has been adjusted to account for the one-time gain from the disposal of Pacific Century Place, Beijing by PCCW's subsidiary PCPD)

PCCW has consistently paid out a good chunk of its earnings as dividends (payout ratio >70%) over the last 4 years. In FY2014, its full year dividend payouts amounted to HK 20.2 cents per share. This translates to S$57.5 million worth of dividends for PCRD. In addition, PCRD also received S$8.9 million in dividend income from HKT directly. This gives it a potential cash income of S$66.4 million annually if the dividend payments are sustained. As an illustration, if all these cash were to be paid out as dividends to PCRD shareholders, it would translate to an annual dividend yield of about 7.0%.

As we previously indicated, the bulk of PCCW's earnings come from HKT and HKT's earning should continue to grow in the near future with the full consolidation of CSL in FY2015. Hence, we believe that both HKT and PCCW's dividend payments are sustainable.

While there is no assurance that PCRD will elect to receive its dividends from PCCW in cash (it opted for scrip dividends in FY2014 and cash in the preceding two years), or that it will resume paying cash dividends in future, the benefits from the cash income from PCCW and HKT should eventually accrue to shareholders in one form or the other. 

Recommendations

We believe PCRD to be deeply undervalued. Based on its latest closing price of S$0.345 per share as at 16 April 2015, it is trading at a steep discount to the market value of its underlying stakes in PCCW and HKT. Even if we were to peg the value of its stake in PCCW to the lowest valuation metrics within its peer group, PCRD would still be trading at a discount of 36.4% to the conservative implied fair value of S$0.542 per share.

With the Company also aggressively buying back its shares and boosting Richard Li's control to 86.7% while simultaneously reducing public float to 13.1%, we also believe this year to be an opportune time for Richard Li to finally pull the privatisation trigger.

Should Richard Li elect not to privatise the Company, shareholders would also benefit, in one form or the other, from PCRD's stake in PCCW and cashcow HKT. Sans share buybacks, if the Company elects to pay out its cash income derived mainly from the dividends collected from PCCW and HKT, we think that the Company would be able to sustain an attractive dividend yield of about 7.0% based on the last traded price of S$0.345 per share, further reinforcing our conviction that the stock is selling at far below its fair value.

Key Risks

Further share buybacks will heighten trading liquidity risks going forward. This is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the Company has at present a sizeable share base of more than 2.7 billion, such that even a minimum 10% float amounts to more than 270 million shares. This should be able to sustain some healthy trading activity going forward.

PCRD has high asset concentration risks as its prospects are predominantly tied to HKT. However, HKT's business model has proven to be resilient over the years especially given its market leadership position in Hong Kong. This should help to ensure that PCRD's earnings going forward remain relatively stable.  

(SGD:HKD X-rate of 5.70 assumed)
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We put money where our mouth is. As such, we do take positions in the securities mentioned on this website or any securities related thereto and may from time to time add or dispose of or may be materially interested in any such securities. The research materials provided on this site is for information only. Investors should seek the assistance of a qualified and licensed financial advisor in making their investment decisions. The research reports/notes are compiled based on information, which we believe to be reliable. Any opinions expressed reflect our judgment at as at the date of the reports or notes and are subject to change without notice. It does not have regards to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and the particular needs of any specific person who may receive or access this research material. Our recommendations are not to be construed as an offer, or solicitation of an offer to sell or buy securities referred herein. The use of this material does not absolve you of your responsibility for your own investment decisions. We accept no liability for any direct or indirect loss arising from the use of this research material. This research material may not be reproduced, distributed or published for any purpose by anyone without our specific prior consent.